Abstract-We study efficiency loss in Bayesian revenue optimal auctions. We quantify this as the worst case ratio of loss in the realized social welfare to the social welfare that can be realized by an efficient auction. Our focus is on auctions with single parameter buyers and where buyers' valuation sets are finite.
I. INTRODUCTION
The two prevalent themes in auction theory are revenue maximization for seller -referred to as optimality, and social welfare maximization -referred to as efficiency. For example, vea is the most widely studied efficient auction, while a Bayesian optimal single item auction for independent private value model was first characterized by Myerson in his seminal work [1] . vea has been generalized for combinatorial auc tions (see [2] for a description); Myerson's optimal auction framework has been extended to a more general single parameter setting (see [3] for a description), and to auctions with single-minded buyers [4] .
An allocation of items among buyers generates value for the items. The realized social welfare is defined as the total generated value. This is an upper bound on the revenue that a seller can extract. Thus, an allocation that creates a large social welfare might appear as a precursor to extracting large revenue; the seller can extract more revenue by first creating a large total value for the items and then collecting a part of it as payments from the buyers. However, in general, an optimal auction is not efficient and vice versa. As presented in [1] , in optimal single item auctions where buyers' private valuations are drawn independently from the same distribution (referred to as same priors from here on), the seller sets a common reserve price and does not sell the item when the values reported by all buyers are below the reserve price. When buyers' private values are realized from different distributions (referred to as diff erent priors from here on), then not only can the reserve prices be different for different buyers, the seller need not always sell the item to the buyer with the highest reported value. However, an efficient auction like vea will award the item to the buyer who values it the most in all such V. Abhishek and B. Hajek are with the Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.
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scenarios. Moreover, in multiple item auctions with single parameter buyers, an optimal auction need not be efficient, even if the buyers have the same priors and there are no reserve prices. We study how much an optimal auction loses in efficiency when compared with an efficient auction. Our metric is the worst case normalized difference in the realized social welfares by an efficient auction and an optimal auction, where the normalization is with respect to the social welfare realized by an efficient auction. The worst case is taken over the probability distributions on buyers' valuations. We refer to this as the worst case efficiency loss ratio (henceforth ELR). This ratio quantifies how much the goal of revenue maximization can be in conflict with the social goal of welfare maximization.
Two previous works that also study the trade-off between optimality and efficiency are [5] and [6] . However, the metrics used by [5] and [6] are the number of extra buyers required by an efficient auction to match an optimal auction in revenue, and the number of extra buyers required by an optimal auction to match an efficient auction in the realized social welfare, respectively. This is fundamentally different from the problem we study here. In [7] , authors find bounds on the informational cost introduced by the presence of private information (see Section V for its relationship with the ELR) for a class of resource allocation problems, but for continuous probability distributions on the cost of resources, and under some restrictive assumptions on the probability distributions.
The main contributions of this paper are the following. We first focus on optimal auctions with binary valued single parameter buyers with different priors. We show that the worst case ELR is no worse than it is with only one buyer; moreover, it is at most 1/2. A tighter bound is obtained for auctions with identical items and buyers with same priors. Moving beyond the case of binary valuations, we focus on single item optimal auctions where buyers have same priors. We reduce the problem of finding the worst case ELR into a relatively simple optimization problem involving only the common probability vector of buyers. We obtain lower and upper bounds on the worst case ELR as a function of r -the ratio of the maximum to the minimum possible value of the item for the buyer, K -the number of discrete values that the buyer can have for the item, and N -the number of buyers.
These bounds are tight asymptotically as K goes to infinity.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II outlines our model, notation, and definitions. Section III summarizes the structure of optimal auctions. Section IV formally defines the problem under investigation and presents the bounds on the ELR. Section V provides some comments and Section VI summarizes the results.
II. MODEL, DEFINITIONS, AND NOTATION
Consider N buyers competing for a set of items that a seller wants to sell. In general, the structure of the problem restricts the possible sets of winners. Such constraints are captured by defining a set A to be the collection of all possible sets of winners; i.e., A E A if A � N and all buyers in A can win simultaneously. We assume that 0 E A, and A is downward closed; i.e., if A E A and B � A, then B E A.
The single-parameter model is rich enough to capture many scenarios of interest. In single item auctions, a buyer gets a certain positive value if he wins the item and zero otherwise.
Here, A consists of all singletons {n}, n E N (and empty set 0). In an auction of S identical items, each buyer wants any one of the S items and has the same value for any one of them. Here, A is any subset of buyers of size at most S. Similarly, in auctions with single-minded buyers [4] with known bundles, each buyer n is interested only in a specific (known) bundle b� of items and has a value v� for any bundle bn such that bn contains the bundle b�, while he has zero value for any other bundle. Here, A is collections of buyers with disjoint bundles.
Denote a typical reported type (henceforth, referred to as a bid) of a buyer n by Vn, where Vn E Xn, and let v � (V1, V 2 , ... , V N) be the vector of bids of everyone. Define
We use the standard game theoretic notation of v -n � (Vlo ... ,Vn -1,Vn + 1o ... ,V N) and v � (vn,v -n). Similar interpretations are used for X -n and X -no Henceforth, in any further usage, Vn, v -n, and v are always in the sets Xn, X -n, and X respectively. Let Xn � (x�, x 2 , ... , xK n ), � n n X1:N = (Xl, X 2 , ... , XN), and define Pn and P1:N similarly.
III. PRELIMINARIES ON BAYESIAN OPTIMAL AUCTIONS
In this section we summarize the structure of an optimal auction for single-parameter buyers. The presentation here is based on [4] , adapted for single-parameter buyers. Readers are referred to [4] and references therein (in particular [8] )
1083 for further details. We will be focusing only on the auction mechanisms where buyers are asked to report their types directly (referred to as direct mechanism). In light of the revelation principle [1], the restriction to direct mechanisms is without any loss of optimality.
A direct auction mechanism is specified by an allocation that buyer n makes to the seller when the bid vector is v. Let Qn(v) be the probability that buyer n wins in the auction when the bid vector is v; i.e,
(1)
AEA: nE A
Buyers are assumed to be risk neutral and have quasilinear payoffs. Given that the value of buyer n is v�, and the bid vector is v, the payoff (expected payoff in case of random allocation) of buyer n is:
The mechanism (7r, M) and the payoff functions [UnlnE.N"
induce a game of incomplete information among the buyers.
The seller's goal is to design an auction mechanism (7r, M) to maximize his expected revenue at a Bayes-Nash equilibrium (BNE) of the induced game. Again, using the revelation principle, the seller can restrict only to the auctions where truth-telling is a BNE (referred to as incentive compatibility) without any loss of optimality. Also, a buyer will voluntarily participate in an auction only if his payoff from participation is nonnegative (referred to as individual rationality). The seller is assumed to have free disposal of items and may decide not to sell some or all items for certain bid vectors.
For each n E N, define the following functions:
Here, qn( vn) is the expected probability that buyer n wins given that he reports his type as Vn while everyone else is truthful. The expectation is over the type of everyone else;
i.e., over X_no Similarly, mn(vn) is the expected payment that buyer n makes to the seller. The incentive compatibility and individual rationality constraints can be expressed mathe matically as follows:
1) Incentive compatibility (IC): qn(x�)x� -mn(xi ) :::-: . . . n qn(x�)x� -mn(x�) for any n EN, and I :::; i,j :::; Kn. Under IC, all buyers report their true types. Hence, the expected revenue that the seller gets is IE [ 2:=;; =1 Mn (X)] . The expectation here is over the random vector X. Thus, the optimal auction problem is to maximize the seller's expected revenue subject to the IC and IR constraints.
Define the virtual-valuation function Wn of buyer n as:
where we use the notational convention of x;[ n + l � 0 and Lf: K n + 1 (.) � o. The propos�tion below .
identifies the maximum expected revenue for a gIVen allocatlOn rule, over all payment rules that meet the IC and IR constraints. In particular, it identifies whether such payment rules exist. 
. (6) Proposition 1 suggests that an optimal auction can be found by selecting the allocation rule 'Ir (and hence [QnlnEN) to maximize the sum in (6) . However, if the wn's are not monotone nondecreasing, the resulting allocation rule would not necessarily satisfy the required monotonicity condition on the qn's. This problem can be remedied by using another function, Wn, called the monotone virtual valuation (hence forth MVV), as follows. Let (g� , h� ) � (0, -x�), (g� , h�) � ( ",i ".,j _xi+ l (", K n ' + 1 pt)) for 1 < i < Kn -1, and 0) . Then, . wn(x�) is the slope .of . the line joining the point (g� -I, h� -I ) to the point (g� , h�); I.e., Wn (x�) = (h� -h�-I ) / (g� -g� -I). Find the lower convex hull of points (g� , h�), 0 :::; i :::; Kn, and let Ji:;. be the point on this convex hull corresponding to g� . Then, wn(x�) is the slope of the line joining the point (g� -1 , X� -I ) to the point
g n' n ' I.e, Wn x n -n n n n . that, wn(x�) :::; wn(x�+ 1 ) for all n EN and 1 :::; i :::; Kn-l. Also, if wn(x�) :::; wn(x�+ I) for 1 :::; i :::; Kn -1, then wn is equal to Wn.
An optimal auction, which uses the MVVs just defined, is the maximum weight algorithm shown as Algorithm 1. The set W( v) is the collection of all feasible subsets of buyers with maximum total MVVs for the given bid vector v. Since A is downward closed and 0 E A, no buyer n with wn(vn) < 0 is included in the set of winners W(v). Depending on the tie breaking rule, a buyer n with Wn(vn) = 0 may or may not be included in the set of winners. Assume that only buyers with wn(vn) > 0 are considered. Since wn(x�) :::; wn(x�+I), the seller equivalently sets a reserve price for each buyer n. A buyer whose bid is below his reserve price never wins.
From [4] , the reserve price x� for buyer n is:
V n E X n 1084 Algorithm 1 Maximum weight algorithm Given a bid vector v:
1) Compute wn(vn) for each n E N.
2) Take 'Ir(v) to be any probability distribution on the collection W(v) defined as:
AEA nE A
Obtain the set of winners W(v) by sampling from W(v) according to 'Ir ( V ) .
3) Collect payments given by:
where Qn is given by (1), and Qn(x�, v -n) � o.
IV. EFFICI ENCY Loss IN OPTIMAL AUCTIONS
Given any incentive compatible auction mechanism ( 'Ir, M), 
n=1 AEA nE A an efficient allocation rule 'Ire (v) is given by any probability distribution over the set argmax AEA ( L nE A vn ) . It is easy to verify that 'Ire satisfies the monotonicity condition needed by Proposition 1. The corresponding maximum social welfare (henceforth MSW) is given by:
nE A where X l :N and P l :N are as defined in Section II.
By contrast, an optimal auction, described in Section III, involves maximizing the sum of MVVs instead of the sum of true valuations. Consequently, it differs from an efficient auction in three ways. First, the buyers with negative MVVs (equivalently, their bids are below their respective reserve prices) do not win. Second, even if the bid of one buyer is higher than that of another, their corresponding MVVs might be in a different order. Hence, in single item optimal auctions, the winner is not necessarily the buyer with the highest valuation for the item. Finally, for a multiple item auction with single-parameter buyers, the allocation that maximizes the sum of the MVV s might be different from the one that maximizes the sum of the true valuations.
The social welfare realized by an optimal allocation cannot be more than the MSW. We quantify how much an optimal allocations loses in the realized social welfare when compared with the MSW. We normalize this loss in the realized welfare by the MSW. Let 'Ir0 be an optimal allocation rule given by Recalling step 2 of Algorithm 1, any optimal allocation rule 7r0 is a probability distribution on W(v). Different probability distributions on W(v) correspond to different tie breaking rules for selecting a set of winners W(v) E W(v) l .
They result in the same expected revenue but different realized social welfare. Since the tie-breaking rule is determined by the auction designer (or the seller), we break ties in the favor of the allocation rule that maximizes the social welfare realized within the set of optimal allocations (see Section V for a related discussion). Call the resulting allocation rule ir°.
Given r > 1 and a positive integer K, define Vr, K as the set of (Xl:N' Pl:N) satisfying the following properties: 1) For each n E N, 0 < x� < x� < ... < x{fn, where Kn ::; K; and (maxnEN x{fn )/(minnEN x� ) ::; r.
2) For each n E N, Pn is a valid probability vector of dimension Kn, where Kn ::; K; and p� > 0 for all n EN and 1 ::; i ::; Kn. The MSW is continuous in Xl:N and Pl:N' A slight perturbation in x�'s or in p�'s can make the MVVs that are zero negative, but still very close to zero, while causing a very small change in the MSW. Hence, even if we restrict to optimal allocations that only include the buyers with positive MVVs, the supremum in (11) remains unchanged. Consequently, in the subsequent treatment, for the ease of analysis, we will confine to an efficient allocation within the set of optimal allocations that only includes the buyers with positive MVVs. For notational convenience, we drop Xl:N, Pl:N, and A from the arguments of the MSW and ELR functions defined by (9) and (10) whenever the underlying Xl:N, Pl:N, and A are clear from the context.
A. Auctions with binary valued single-parameter buyers
We first bound the worst case ELR for optimal auctions with binary valued single-parameter buyers. Assume that each random variable Xn takes only two values, Hn and Ln, with probabilities P n and 1 -P n respectively. Here, Hn > Ln > O. The virtual-valuation function Wn is given by wn(Hn) = Hn and wn(Ln) = (Ln -Hn P n)/(l -P n). Clearly, wn(Ln) < wn(Hn), and hence Wn = wn. The reserve price x� for buyer n is Hn if P nHn 2: Ln, otherwise Ln.
Example 1: Suppose there is only one buyer. We drop the subscript n because n == 1. The buyer's value for winning, X, is H with probability P and L otherwise, where 0 < L < H.
Here, A = {0, {I n. If pH < L, then buyer 1 always wins under the optimal allocation, irrespective of the value of X. This is also the efficient allocation. However, if pH 2: L, then w(L) ::; 0 and buyer 1 wins only if he bids H. This is not efficient because the buyer is not a winner if X = L. The social welfare realized is pH while the 1 -p)L) . This is maximized at pr = 1, where r = H/L. Thus, ELR(7r°) = (r -1)/(2r -1). As r ---+ 00 (so P ---+ 0), ELR(7r°) ---+ 1/2.
The following proposition shows that the worst case ELR for multiple binary valued single-parameter buyers is no worse than it is for the one buyer example given above. It is easy to verify that the above inequality holds for each n EN (the analysis is similar to Example 1). This completes the proof. z·x·. An optimal allocation awards the item to a buyer with the highest positive MVV. The MVVs are nondecreasing in the true values but need not be strictly increasing. Tie is broken in the favor of a buyer with the highest value for the item. This maximizes the social welfare realized within the set of optimal allocations. Since Xn ' s are i.i.d., the reserve prices are same for everyone. Hence, the optimal allocation rule 1fo sets a common reserve price for everyone, and awards the item to the buyer with the highest valuation for it. The loss in efficiency is only because of not selling the item if the maximum bid of all the buyers is below the common reserve price.
Let p � (p l ,p 2 , ... ,pK) and x � (x l ,x 2 , ... ,xK). Let the reserve price be xt ( x , p ) , where t(x, p) is the index corresponding to the reserve price. From (7) ,
The social welfare realized by the optimal allocation is ""K ( ) ZiXi. Hence the ELR for single item auctions as 6't=t X , p , a function of x and p is given by:
where we use ELR(x, p, N) to denote the ELR function defined by (10). This is because Xn and Pn are same for all n E N, A contains only singletons, and 1fo is kept fixed in the subsequent discussion.
The worst-case ELR is given by the following optimization problem:
x,p subject to: pi > 0 for 1 :::: : i :::: : K, L� l pi = 1, o < x l < x 2 < ... < xK, xK:::: : rx l .
(16)
The optimum value of the above problem is denoted by ",(r, K, N). We start with the following lemmas that help us reduce the search space over x and p. Detailed proofs are omitted because of space constraints. Proof' From (13), we have the following equivalence:
. pKxK t(x, p) = K <=} x ' :::: : K . , 1:::: : i :::: : K -1. (19) L j= i p J Since the ELR is invariant to scaling of x, we can fix xK = r. With this, the constraint xK /x l :::: : r reduces to X l :::: 1, and hence we must have rpK :::: 1. Fixing p (and hence fixing z), and setting xK = r, we see from (14) that ELR(x, p, N) is increasing in each Xi, 1 :::: : i :::: : K -1. Hence, set Xi = (rpK)/(Lf= i pi). Also, maximizing ELR(x,p,N) is equivalent to maximizing (L�� l Zixi)/(ZKxK). The proof easily follows from these observations.
• Lemma 3: 'Y(r, K, N) defined in Lemma 2 is nondecreasing in K for fixed r and N.
Proof' (Outline) Given p, construct p of dimension K + 1 as p = (f, p l -f, p 2 , ... ,pK), where 0 < f < p l . For f small enough, and an appropriate choice of p, we can make the K + 1 dimension version of the objective function of (17) arbitrary close to 'Y(r, K, N). Clearly, this cannot be more than 'Y(r, K + 1, N). Single item auction, 1 buyer, and fi K = p K -E(l -p K ), where E > 0 is such that p K _ E(l-p K ) ?: 1/r. The objective function of (17) with p can be shown to be an increasing function of E. Hence, E can be set to be the maximum possible.
• We now state the main proposition of this section which follows easily from Lemmas 1-4. As a consequence of Proposition 4, we obtain a closed form expression for the worst case ELR for single buyer case, and lower and upper bounds on the worst case ELR for multiple buyers. The results are summarized in Table I . The details of the derivations are omitted because of space constraints. The lower and upper bounds for multiple buyers are tight asymptotically as K goes to infinity. Also, keeping r and K fixed, the worst case ELR goes to zero as N goes to infinity at the rate 0 ((1 -1/r)N) .
V. DISCUSSION (a) On tie breaking: The worst case ELR problem can also be defined under breaking ties in the favor of the least efficient allocation among the set of optimal allocations. The results of Section IV-A still hold true. Also, the lower bound on the ELR of Section IV-B for single item auctions with multiple buyers is still a valid lower bound under this tie breaking. if he exactly knew the buyers' type (same as the MSW) and the revenue collected by an optimal auction under private types is called information rent. Because of the IR constraint, the optimal revenue cannot be larger than the realized social welfare. Hence, the ELR is less than or equal to the ratio of information rent and the MSW. In fact, the proof of Proposition 2 finds an upper bound on the ratio of information rent and the MSW.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this work, we highlighted the differences between the objectives of revenue maximization and social welfare maxi mization. We quantified this as the loss in efficiency in optimal auctions and obtained bounds on the same for various cases. A summary of the results is presented in Table I .
